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THE IMPACTS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
Murray L. Weidenbaum 
The process of regulation of business activity via governmental rules and 
regulations generates a variety of impacts, direct and indirect, intended and 
unintended, desirable and undesirable. Proponents of governmental intervention 
stress the benefits that are expected to flow or the social problems to be 
solved. The costs which are involved tend to be discounted or even ignored --
11If we can put a man on the moon, why can't we clean up the Mississipp1?11 
The purpose of this report is to examine the various costs that are incurred 
in the process of government regulation. 1 No judgments are expressed on .the 
value of the many regulatory efforts. By raising the public information level, 
it is hoped that governmental decision making in this important area can become 
a more balanced process, giving equal weight to the costs and other disadvantages 
as well as the benefits and other advantages of proposed actions. The resul t , 
hopefully, will be the attainment of important national objectives with greater 
effectiveness than characterizes the present situation. 
Summary 
The impacts of government regulation of business are being felt in every 
part of the economy: 
1. The taxpayer feels the effect. Government regulation literally has 
become a major growth industry, an industry supported by the taxp~er. The 
cost of operating federal regulatory agencies is rising more rapidly than the 
budget as a whole, the population, or the gross national product (see Figure 1). 
Mr. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at 
Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. This report was prepared for the 
Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Economic Growth and Stabilization, 
U.S. Congress, April 1978, for their use in evaluating the impact of federal 
rules and regulations on the American private sector. It was originally titled 
11The Cost of Government Regulation of Business." 
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Outlays of 41 regulatory agencies are estimated to increase from $2.2 billion in 
the fiscal year 1974 to $4.8 billion in fiscal 1979, a growth of 115 percent over 
the five-year period. 
2. The motorist feels the effect. Federally-mandated safety and environ-
mental features increase the price of the average passenger car by $666 in 1978 
(see Figure 2). Compliance with those regulations costs American consumers $7 
billion a year in the form of higher priced cars. In addition, the added weight 
of the cars is increasing fuel consumption perhaps by as much as $3 billion -
annually. Thus, the American motorist may be paying in the neighborhood of $10 
billion a year to meet federal regulatory requirements in the two areas of 
environment and safety. 
3. The businessman feels the effect. There are over 4,400 different fed-
eral forms that the private sector must fill out each year. That takes over 
143 million man hours, the economic equivalent of a small army. The Federal 
Paperwork Commission estimated that the total cost of federal paperwork imposed 
on private industry ranges from $25 billion to $32 billion a year and that 11 a 
substantial portion of this cost is unnecessary." The smaller business is hit 
disproportionately hard by paperwork, as well as other types of government regu-
lation. 
4. The homeowner feels the effect. Regulatory requirements imposed by 
federal, state, and local governments are adding between $1500 and $2500 to the 
cost of a typical new house. Using the midpoint of that range of cost estimates 
(42,000) and applying it to the two million new homes built in 1977 results in 
an added cost to the homeowner of $4 billion last year. 
5. The consumer feels the effect. The costs of complying with government 
regulations are inevitably passed on by business to the consumer in the form 
of higher prices. The aggregate cost of complying with federal regulation 
came to $62.9 billion in 1976, or over $300 for each man, woman and child in 
the United States. The estimated $62.9 billion of costs imposed on 
5 
.,.. 
~ 
IU 
... 
::s 
en 
. ~ 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
....... 
....... 
01 
... 
oq 
....... 
01 
,_ 
~ 
Ill 
.., 
f 
u 
c: 
.... 
~ 
c: 
~ 
~ 
0. 
50 • 
25 . 
0 
- 3 -
FIGURE 1 
GROWTH OF FEDERAL REGULATORY EXPENDITURES 
AND OTHER ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Population 
1974 - 1977 
55% 
GNP Federal Regulatory 
Expenditures ExpP.ndi tures 
FIGURE 2 
SOURCE': r..mter for the Study 
of American Businsss 
AUTOMOBILE PRICE INCREASES DUE 10 
FEDERAL SAFETY AND EMISSIONS CONTROL REGULATION 
(Retail Prices. P~r Auto) 
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the private sector is twenty times the $3.1 billion spent to operate the · 
regulatory agencies in the same year (see ·Figure 3). If we apply the same 
multiplier of twenty to the amounts budgeted for regulatory activitf.es 
for more recent years, we can come up with approximations of the private 
sector•s cost of compliance and thus with the total dollar impact of govern-
ment regulation. On that basis, it can be estimated that the costs arisfng 
from government regulation of business (both the expenses of the regulatory 
agencies themselves as well as the costs they induce in the private sector) 
totalled $79.1 billion in the fiscal year 1977 and may reach $96.7 billion 
in the current fiscal year. On the basis of the budget estimate for the 
fiscal year 1979 the aggregate cost of government regulation may come to 
$102.7 billion, cons·isting of $4.8 billion of direct expenses by the federal 
regulatory agencies and $97.9 billion of costs of compliance on the part of 
the private sector. Although there is no assurance that larger budgets for 
federal regulatory agencies generate a constant multiplier effect on the 
private sector, the analysis in the body of this report tends to. show that 
the data used here for private sector regulatory costs are substantially 
underestimated. 
6. The worker feels the effect. Government regulation, albeit un-
intentionally, can have strongly adverse effects on employment. The mini~um 
wage law has priced hunareds of thousands of people out of labor markets. 
One increase alone has been shown, on the basis of careful research, to · 
have reduced teenage employment by 225,000, with a disporportionately large 
impact on non-white youngsters. Many industry facilities and entire factories 
have been closed down -- with substantial but unmeasurable effects on . 
employment-- because of the high costs of meeting environmental, safety and 
other regulatory requirements. 
FIGURE 3 
THE MULTIPLIER IN OPERATION: 
The Total Cost of Federal Regulation in Fiscal Year 1979 
Regu lator~ Costs 
Administrat ive $ 4.8 billion 
Compliance 97.9 bi 1.1 ion 
Total $102.7 billion 
$4.8 Billion 
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7. The investor feels the effect. Appl"oximately $10 billion .of 
new private capital spending is devoted each year to ~eeting governmenta11y 
mandated environmental, safety, and similar regulations rather .. than being 
invested in profit-making projects. Edward Denison of the Broo·kings 
Institution has estimated that in recent years these deflections of private 
investment from productive uses have resulted in a loss of approximately 
one-fourth of the potential annual increase in productivity. Although 
not directly calculable, the result is to exacerbate the already strong 
inflationary pressures in the American economy. 
8. The nation as a whole feels the effect of government regulation 
in many ways. The adverse consequences range from a slowdown in the 
availability of new pharmaceutical products to the cancellation of numerous 
small pension plans. In total, the aggregate response to th~ proliferation 
of government regulation is a basic bureaucratization of American business. 
These undramatic but fundamental effects occur because of the diversion of 
management attention from traditional product development, production and 
marketing efforts designed·to provide new and better products a~d services. 
to meeting governmentally imposed social requirements. 
The New Wave of Government Regulation · 
It is hard to overestimate the current rapid expansion of government 
involvement in business in the United States. Certainly the majority of 
public policy changes affecting business-government relations in re~e~t 
·years has been in the direction of greater governmental intervention --
environmental controls, job safety inspections, equal employment opportu-
n~ty enforcement, consumer product safety regulations, energy restrictions, 
- 7 ·-
and recording and reporting of items ranging from illnesses to fore.1gn . 
currency transact·ions~ Indeed, when we attempt to look a~ the ·emerging 
business-government relationship from the business executiv~'s.v1ewpoint, 
a very considerable public presence is evident in what .ostens~bl~,,.o.r.- .. · 
at least historically, have been private affairs. 
No one who operates a business today, neither the head .of a large 
company nor the corner grocer, can do so without considering a mult.itu~e 
of governmental restrictions a~~ regulations. H1s or her costs and-profits 
can be affected as much by a bill passed in Washington as by a management 
decision ·fn the front office or a customer• s decision at the checkout 
counter. Management decisions fundamentai to the business enterprise 
are increas1ngly becoming subject to governmental influence, review, . 
or control, decisions such as: What lines of business to go int o? What 
products can be produced? Which investments can be financed? Under what 
conditions can products be produced? Where can they be made? . How can 
they be marketed? What prices can be charged? What profit can. ~e made~ 
Virtually every major department of the typical indust rial corpo_rat1on 
in the United States has one or more counterparts in a federal agency that 
controls or strongly influences its internal decision making. The sc1en .... · 
tists in corporate research laboratories now receive much of ~heir guidance 
from lawyers in federal, state, and local regulatory agencieso The . 
engineers in manufacturing departments must abide by standards promulga~ed . 
by Labor Department authorities. Marketing divisions must .follow_procedures 
established by government administrators in product safety agencies. The 
location of facilities must be in conformance with a variety of environ-
mental statutes. The activities of personnel staffs are increasingly 
restricted by the various executive agencies concerned with employment 
- 8 -
conditions. Finance departments often bear the brunt of the rising paper-. 
work burden being imposed on business by government agencies who seem to 
assume that information is a free good -- or in any event that more is 
always better than less. 
The newer types of governmental regulation of business are not 
limited to the traditional regulatory agencies, such as the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Federal Communi-
cations Commission. Rather, the line operating departments and bureaus 
of government -- the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health-Education-
Welfare, Interior, Justice, Labor, Transportation, and Treasury -~ are 
now involved in actions that affect virtually every firm. 
Impetus for this expa.nded government participation in economic 
activity is being provided by a variety of consumer groups, environmental 
organizations, civil right~ advocates, labor unions, and other ~itizens' 
institutions. In many cases, the increasing_regulation reflects public 
and congressional concern that traditional federal and state-local programs 
have not been effective. The new wave of regulation is also reinforced 
by the belief that the private sector itself is responsible for many of 
the problems facing society ~- pollution, discrimination in emplojment, 
unsafe products, unhealthy working environments, misleading financial 
reporting, and so forth. The present trends 1n federal government regula-
tion in the United States do not .represent an abrupt departure from an 
idealized free rna rket econofl\Y, but rather the rapid i ntens i fi cat 1·on of 
the long-term expansion of government influence over the private sector. 
Government regulation at times can be justified as a logical response 
to imperfections in the private economy or what economists call "faiJures 11 
in the normal market system. Examples.of such situations are pollution of 
~ 9 -
the environment, inadequate industrial safety practices, and long-tenm 
health hazards. Voluntary action to deal with such problems may place· 
a f1nm under a competitive disadvantage. The specific company attempting 
to correct the situation would tend to bear the full costs, while the 
benefits of the improvement would be widely dispersed in the society. 
"Free riders .. who do not make the expensive changes may nevertheless share 
in the benefits (those "externalities" that economists write about) •. 
An example of this situation is provided by the regulation of 
pollution standards in the motor vehicle area. The basic justification 
.for government setting standards for automobiles -- particularly in the 
pollution area where so much of the benefit goes to society as a whole --
was clearly stated by John J. Riccardo, president of Chrysler: 
..... a large part of the public will not voluntarily 
spend extra money to install en1ission control systems 
which will help clean the air. Any manufacturer who 
installs and charges for such equipment while his 
competition doesn't soon finds he is losing sa.les and 
customers. In cases like this, a government standard 
requiring everyone to have such equipment is the only 
way to protect both the public and the manufacturer." 
The -current wave of government regulati·on is not merely an intensi-
fication of traditional activities. In good measure, it is a new departure 
and requires a new way of thinking. The standard theory of government 
regulation of business, which is still in general use and has dominated 
professional and public thinking on the subject, is based on the model 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Under this approach, a federal 
commission 1s established to regulate a specific industry, with .the 
related concern of promoting the well-being of that industry •. Often the 
public or consumer interest is viewed as subordinate, or even ignored, as 
the agency focuses on the needs and concerns of the industry that 1t 1s 
regulating. 
- 10 -
In some cases -- because of the unique eKpertise por~sessed b.v the 
members· of the industry o·r its job enticements for regul utors who leave 
.. 
government employment -- the regulatory corrmission may become a captive 
of the industry which it is supposed to regulate. At least, this is a · · 
popularly held view of the development of the regulatory pro.cess·. Actual 
practice of course varies by agency and jurisdiction and .over ti·me. In 
addition to the ICC, other examples of this development which have been 
cited from time to time include the Civil Aeronautic~ Board, the Federal 
Co11111unications Conmission, the Federal Power Commission (now the· Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission),·and the Federal Maritime Commiss1on. 2 
Although the traditional type of federal regulation of business surely 
continues, the new regulatory efforts established by the Congress in recent 
years follow, in the main, a fundamentally different pattern. Evaluating 
. 
the activities of these newer regulatory efforts with the ICC type of model 
is inappropriate and can lead to undesirable public policy. The new 
federa·l regulatory agencies are simultaneously broader in the scope of 
their jurisdiction than the ICC-CAB-·FCC model, yet in important aspects 
are far more restricted. This anomaly lies at the heart of the proble~ 
of relating their efforts to national interests {see Figure 4) . . 
In the cases of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Equal. Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the 
. . . _, 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Federal Energy 
Administration, the regulatory agency is not limited to a single industry. 
For each of these relative newcomers. to the federal bureaucracy, its juris-
diction extends to the bulk of the private sector and at times to produc-
tive activities in the public sector itself. It is this far-ranging 
characteristic that makes it impractical for any single industry to 
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dominate these regulatory activities in the manner of .the traditional 
mod.el. What specific industry is going to capture the EEOC or OSHA? 
Or.would have the incentive to do so? 
Yet, in comparison to the older agencies oriented to specific indus~ 
tries, in many important ways the newer federal regulators operate 1-n a. 
far narrower sphere. That is, they are not concerned with the totality 
of a company or industry, but only with the limited segment of operations 
which falls under their jurisdiction. The ICC, for example, must pay 
attention to the basic mission of the trucking industry, to provide· 
transportation services to the public, as part of its supervision of 
rates and entry into the trucking business. The EPA•s interest in the 
trucking industry, on the other hand, is almost exclusively in the effect 
of trucking operations on the environment. This restriction prevents 
the agency from developing too close a concern with the overall well-being 
of any company or industry. Rather, it can result i.n a total lack of 
concern over the effects of its specific actions on a company or industry. 
If there is any special interest that may come to dominate such a 
functionally-oriented agency. it is the one that is preoccupied with its 
specific task -- ecologists, unions, civil rights groups, and consumerists. 
Thus, little if any attention may be given to the basic mission of the 
industry to provide goods and services to the public. Also ignored are 
crosscutting concerns or matters broader than the specific charter of the · 
regulating agency, such as productivity, economic growth, employment, 
cost to· the consumer, effects on overall living standards, and inflat1onar,y 
1mpacts. While the traditional regulatory agencies may be said to be 
overly concerned at times with economic growth and productive efficiency. 
the newer programs move to a different beat. Their impetus comes 
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from such social considerations as improving the quality of life, both on 
and off the job, and changing the distribution of income so as to 
achieve greater equity among the various groups in the society. 
To be sure, there are important cases which combine a blend of the 
old and new forms of regulation. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
is a good example. In one aspect of its activities, it regulates a 
specific branch of the economy, the securities industry. Yet, many of 
its rules also influence the way in which a great many companies prepare 
their financial statements and reports to shareholders. EconomY-wide 
regulatory agencies are not a recent creation. The Federal Trade Commission 
has existed for six decades. Moreover, a few one-industry agencies 
continue to be created, notably the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
which regulates the financial markets dealing with products of agriculture 
and other extractive industries. 
Varying alliances arise in promoting a given type of regulatory 
activity -- or in pushing for reform. The business firms and labor 
unions in a given regulated industry often become strong supporters of 
the traditional industry-oriented commission which they have learned to 
live with, 1f not to dominate. They may join ranks to oppose efforts by 
consumer groups and economists to cut back on the extent of the "protec-
tive" regulation. This has been most apparent in the railroad and· truck-
ing industries. 
In contrast, consumer groups advocate expanding the newer types of 
crosscutting or functional regulation. In this effort, they often are 
joined by labor groups, particularly in the occupational health area. 
Here, reform efforts may be led by coalitions of business groups and 
economists, who are concerned with the excessive costs and other consequences 
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of the spec1aliz~d regulatory activities. These alliances may shift from 
time to time. Specific safety regulations for automobiles may be opposed 
by unions and companies in the motor vehicle industry -- although the two 
groups may differ strongly on job safety standards. Labor, management, 
and local governments may present a united opposition against specific 
environmental effot'ts which are viewed as hurting the economies of their 
coiTIIlunity, although some of these groups may advocate general ecological . 
advances. The o 1 der consumer or·gani zati ons may become more concerned 
with the ultimate cost to the consumer of expanding governmental act1.vit1es 
than the newer and more militant groups that emphasize public control over 
private sector activities. 
Although the precise changes that will occur in the years ahead are 
basically a matter for conjecture, the overall trend seems to be fairly 
clear: on balance there is 1 ikely to be more and not less gover·nment 
intervention in internal business decision making. Desp'ite differences 
1n philosophy and outlook, changes both in control of the Executive Branch 
and in the composition of the Congress and the Judiciary seem to have 
little effect in altering that trend. 
Government regulation, however, is a phenomenon still in the process 
of development, rather than having attained a "steady state." The basic 
factors causing the changes are diverse, ranging from the con~e~n by some 
with the quality of life to the desire by others to increase the social 
responsiveness of business enterprise. Yet, proposals for chang~s in 
public policy affecting business are v1rtually all variations on a single 
predictable theme: to increase the scope and degree of governmental 
involvement while shifting costs from the federal treasury to the products 
and services that consumers buy. 
.. 1 b -· 
No ba 1 anced eva·l uati on uf the avera 11 practice of government regul ~­
tion comfortably fits the notion of benign and wise offic1~1~· always 
making sensible decisions in the society's greater interests. Numerous ·. 
adverse side-effects and other costs are evident, as well as substantial 
benefits to society. 
Th~_l!~cts__Qf__§overn~ent Regul ati or1 
The in1tia'J and dif'·ect effects of gover·nment regulation can be 
measured by the budgets of the regulatory agencies themselves. These 
governmental outlays indicate the costs of regulation which are borne 
by the taxpayers. Preliminary figures for the fiscal year 1979 show a 
total of $4.8 bil"fion in federal expenditures to operate 41 agencies 
which regulate business.. That dollar figure is more than double the 
amount budgeted as recently as fiscal 1974. Clearly , the cost of operating 
federa 1 regula tory agencies ·1 s rising more rapidly than the fede ra 1 
budget as a whole, the population of the country, the gross national 
product .• or any other applicable basis for comparison. 
As shown in Table 1, the bulk of the regulatory budgets is devoted 
to the newer areas of social regulation, such as job safety, energy and 
the environment, and consumer safety and health. Examples of agencies 
involved 1n this newer type of regulation are the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, and the Department of Energy. Unlike the 
traditional regulating colllllissions which generally have jurisdiction 
over individual industries, these agencies cover virtually a.ll companies. 
including many sectors of economic activity which are not generally 
thought of as being regulated by government. 
Area of Regulation 
Consumer Safety and 
Health 
Job Safety and Other 
Working Conditions 
Environment and 
Energy 
Financial Reporting, 
and Other Financial 
Industry-Specific 
Regulation 
Total 
Table 1 . 
1974 1975 1976 1977 . 1978 
$1,302 $1,463 $"1 ,613 $1 ,985 $2$582 
310 379 445 492 562 
347 527 682 870 989 
36 45 53 58 70 
245 269 270 309 340 
---
$2,240 $2,683 $3,064 $3,714 ~4 ,54 3 
Percent Distribution of Federal Regulatory £xpe~citures 
Fiscal Year 1979 
Consumer Safety and Health 
Job Safety and Other Working Conditions 
Environment and Energy 
Financial Reporting and Other Financial 
Industry-Specific Regulation 
56% 
13 
23 
1 
7 
TOO 
1979 
$2,671 
626 
1 '116 
69 
341 
$4,823 
Source: Center for the Study of American Business. See Appendix for supporting detail. 
I J I i 
Increase 
1974-79 
105% 
102 
222 
-J 
~ 
92 
39 
115 
I I I ~ 
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The figures displayed _in Table 1 reflect the fact that there has 
been, and continue~ to be, a steady yt"owth in the pace of \"'egulatory _ 
activities. From a total of $2.2 billion in the fiscal year 1974, expen-
ditures on federal regulatory activities have risen in each.subsequent 
year, with the largest. increases occurring in the fiscal years 1977 and. 
1978. The costs to the taxpayer are obviously not trivial. but the key · 
effects of gov~rnment reyul a ti on· are in tenns of the comp 1 i a nee by the 
private sector·. 
Regulation and Inflation 
Of the many ways in which government can affect the rate of i.nflat1on, 
perhaps the-least understood method is to require actions in the private 
sector which incredse the cost of production an~ hence the prices of 
products and services sold to the public. Attention-needs to be focused 
on these regulatory policy instruments because their use is becoming more 
widespread and neither the public nor government decision makers realize 
their full inflationary effects. 
In theory, the Federal Reserve System could offset the inflationary 
effects of regulation by maintaining a lower rate of growth of the money 
supply than 1t otherwise would. In practice, however, public policy-
makers, insofar as they see the options clearly, tend to prefer the 
higher rate of inflation to the additional monetary restraint and the 
resulting decreases in employment and output. Also, to the extent that 
regulation results in real resources being devoted to low-payoff activi-
ties, economic welfare is reduced. 
At ·first blush, government imposition of socially desirable require-
ments on business through the regulatory process appears to be an inexpen-
sive way of achieving national objectives. This practice apparently costs 
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the government little and rep\"esents no significant direct burden on the 
taxpayer. But the public does not escape paying the cost. Every time, 
for example, the Environmental Protection Agency imposes a more costly 
(albeit less polluting) method of production on any firm the cost of the · 
firm's product to the consumer \'Jill tend to rise. Similar effects flow 
from the ·other regulatory efforts, including those involving product 
safety ·, job health, and hiring and promotion policies. 
These higher prices, however, represent the "hidden tax" of regula-
tion which is shif~ed from the taxpayer to the consumer. The regulat~ry 
"tax" would not be shifted in this manner if the mandated effort -- e.g. 
environmental cleanup -- were conducted or at least financed by the 
government itself. Moreover, to the extent that government-mandated 
requirements impose similar costs on all price categories of a given 
product (such as passenger automobiles), this hidden tax tends to be more 
regressive than the federal income tax or state sales taxes. That 1s, 
the costs may be a relatively higher burden on lower income groups than 
on higher income groups. It is no~ inevitable that every regulatory 
activity increase inflationary pressures. In those instances where regula-
tion generates ~ocial benefits (such as a healthier and thus more produc-
tive work force) in excess of the social costs it imposes, inflationary 
pressures should be reduced. 
At times the impact' of regulation on the prices th_at consumers pay 
is direct and visible. For example, in the case of the passenger auto-
mobile the federal government has required the producers to incorporate 
a wide array of specified safety and environmental features. The a·ureau 
of Labor Statistics each year costs out the effect on the price of the 
average car. Through 1978, the cumulative cost increase per vehicle of 
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these mandated features can~ to $666, or $7.0 billion for all the vehicles 
sold in that year. 3 (See Table 2). 
Government regulation increases the .overhead cost of producing goo4s. 
and services by imposing a rising burden of paperwork. As· of November 30, · 
1976, there were 4,418 different types of approved federal fonms, exclu~fng 
tax and banking fonns. Individuals and business firms ,spend o.ver 143 
million man-hours a year filling them out, according to the U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget. As shown in Table 3, regulatory reports have 
been the fastest growing portiun of the paperwork burden which the 
federal government imposes on the private sector. 
The paperwork and ancillary requirements of federal agencies inevitably. 
produce a "regulatory 'lag, .. a delay that can run into years and can be a 
costly drain on the time and budgets of private managers as wel~ a~ public 
officials. The Federal Trade Commission averages nearly five years to 
complete a rtstra1nt-of-trade case. It took the Federal Power Commission 
11 years to determine how to regulate the price of natural gas all the · 
way back to the wellhead. The regulatory lag appears to be lengthening •. 
Ten years a·go, the director of planning of the Irvine Co~any obtained 
1n 90 days what was then called zoning for a typical residential develop-
ment. ~n 1975, a decade later, the company .received what f.s now call~d 
entitlement to build for one of its developments, following two years of· 
intensive work by a specialized group within the company's planning 
department aided by the public affairs staff. The preparation of·env1ron-· 
mental impact state111ents has become a major source of paperwork. The-
report for one off-shore oil field in the Santa Barbara Channel, for 
· example, required nearly 1,300 pages and took two years to prepare. 4 
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Table 2 
Increase in Retail Price of Automobiles Due to Federal Regu1rements 1. 
1968-78 
Initial Total 
Model Retail Year Adjusted for 
Year Action Price Total Inflation a 
1968 Seat and shoulder belt $ 11.51 
installations 
H.E.W. Standards for ex- 16.00 $ 27.51 $ 47.84 
haust emifosions systems 
1968-69 Windshield defrosting .70 
· and defogging systems 
Windshield wiping and 1. 25 
washing systems 
Door latches and hinge .55 
systems 
Lamps, reflective devices 6.30 8.80 14.53 
and associated equip-
ment 
1969 Head restraints 16.65 16.65 27.48 
1970 Lamps, reflective devices, 4.00 
and associated equip-
ment 
Standards for exhaust emis- 5.50 9.50 .14.77 
sion systems 
1968-70 Theft protection (steering, 7.85 
transmission and igni-
tion locking and buzzing 
system) 
Occupant protection in in- • 35 8.20 12.75 
terior impact (glove box 
door remains closed on 
impact) 
1971 Fuel evaporative systems 19.00 19.00 28.33 
1972 Improved exhaust emissions 6.00 
standards required by 
Clean Air Act 
Warranty changes result-
ing from federal re-
quirement that all ex-
1.00 
haust emissions systems 
be warranted for 5 
years or 50,000 miles 
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Initial Total 
Model Retail Year Adjusted fir 
Year Action Price Total Inflation 
----· 
1972 Voluntarily added safety 2.00 (cont.) features in anticipation 
of future safety require-
ments 
Seat belt warning ~ystem ~0.25 29.25 42.37 
and locking device on 
retractors 
1972-73 Exterior protection (stan-
dard #215) 69.90 69.90 
95 .• 29 
1973 Location, identification, .60 
and illumination of 
controls improvements 
Reduced fl an1nabi 1 i ty of 5.80 6.40 8.7~ 
interior materials 
. 1969-73 Improved side door 15.30 15.30 20.85 
strength 
1974 Interlock system and 107.60 
other changes to meet 
federal safety re-
quirements 
133.50 Improved exhaust emis- 1.40 109.00 
sions systems to comply 
with the Federal Clean 
Air Act 
1975 Additional safety features 10.70 
associated with federal 
motor vehicle safety 
standards #105, #208, 
and #216 
Installation of catalytic 119.20 129.90 146.66 . 
converter 
1975-76 Removal of interlock system 18.00 (quality decrease) and 
add'l installation of 
catalytic.converters 
net effects {Oct.'76) 
1976 FM~ #105 hydraulic brake 
system 6.50 
FMVSS #215 improved bumpers 4.80 
FMVSS #301 leak resistant 
fuel system 2.10 
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·.,. 
Total 
Model 
Year Action 
Initial 
Retail 
Price 
Year 
..Total 
. Adjusted fir . 
· .. Inflation · -
1976 
(cont.) 
. 1977 
1978 
Improved emissionscontrol 7.60 
system 
FMVSS #215 improved bumpers 1.30 · 
FMVSS #219 structural changes .95 
FMVSS #301 leak resistant 
fuel system 4.70 
Improved .emissionscontrol 14.30 
system 
Redesign of emissionscon- 9.99 
trol systems to meet 
HEW air quality stan-
dards 
TOTAL $519.65 
39.00 '41. 54 
21.25 '21 .2~ 
9,99 
. ... 9 .. 9~. 
$519.65 . $665.87 . 
8Yearly totals are expressed in 1977 dollars by use of the con$umer ·prfce 
index. 
Source: Compiled from data supplied by the U.S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
.· · : . 
I 
Table 3 
Repetitive Public-Use Reports Approved for Use by Office of Management and Budget, December, 1966-June, 1973 
· Number of Fonns and Man-Hours Requ1red to Comrete. by Type of Fonn (Man-Hours in millions. 
Administrative Statistical Regulation 
A~~lications Reeorts ReQorts Re~orts Total 
As of Date Number Man-Hours Number Man-Hours Number Man-Hours Number Man-Hours Number Man-Hours 
December, 1966 1,065 38.3 2,213 49.9 1,243 11.8 259 3.3 4,780 103.3 
June, 1967 1 ,091 37.4 2,320 49.6 1,278 12.2 245 3.1 4,934 102.4 
December, 1967 1,110 43.8 2,369 51.1 1,273 12.3 239 3.0 4,991 110.3 
I 
June, 1968 1,107 45.6 2,448 51.7 1,278 12.2 247 3.1 5,080 112.6 1'\) w 
December, 1968 1,123 41.3 2,480 52.0 1,267 14.0 249 2.8 5,119 110.1 
June, 1969 1,145 41.5 2,520 52.5 1,265 14.2 246 3.2 5,176 111.4 
December. 1969 1,138 41.0 2,544 52.1 1,268 14.2 252 3.3 5,202 ~10.6 
June, 1971 1 t 187 44.6 2,705 57.1 1,339 14.7 268 6.0 5,499 122.5 
December, 1971 1,152 46.8 2,570 57.5 1,318 11.4 258 - 14.8 - 5,298 130.5 
June, 1972 1,207 41.6 2,613 66.0 1,314 13.3 271 15.1 5,405 136.0 
December. 1972 1,258 41.0 2,623 75.4 1,332 16.1 328 8.0 5,541 140.4 
June, 1973 1.308 48.4 2.616 72.0 1,306 16.1 337 8.7 5,567 145.3 
Percent change 22.81 26.4% 18.2% 44.3S 5.11 36.4S 30.11 63.6S 16.51 40~7s 
Source: - u.S~ Senate, C00111ittee on Government Operations, Improving the Coordination of Federal ~~rt1ng 
Services. Hearings on 5.200 and 5.1812, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1973. 
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Other aspects of government reyulatory activities also can be ~ostly. 
Severa 1 research efforts exami n1 ng bu11 ding regulations have documented · 
repeated instances of incl·eases in the price of housing as a· r~sult. or· . 
local building codes. Rutgers University reported ·that overly stringent 
or outdated codes increase housing costs by somewhere between 5 and 1.0 
percent of total unit costs. 5 
A study in Colorado found that changing regulatory requirements and 
practices had added $1,500- $2,000 to the cost of the typical new house 
built between 1970 and 1975. The added cost consisted of higher water 
and sewer tap fees, increased permit fees, greater school and park land 
dedication requirements, and new mandates for wider and thicker streets. 
fences. underground stonm sewersp and environmental impact studies. 
In St. Louis County, Missouri, the increase in lot development and 
homebuilding costs due to meeting _government requirenEnts during 1970-
1975 came to $1,600- $2,500 for a typical 1600 squ~re foo.t ho~se on a 
10,000 square foot lot. The new governmentally-imposed requirements . 
included street lighting, greater collector street widths, higher penm1t 
and inspection fees, added features to electrical systems. and smoke 
detectors. 
A study covering 21 residential development projects i-n the New Jersey 
Coastal Zone estimated the direct regulatory expenses for a s1~gle family 
house at $1,600 during the period 1972-75. The costs covered some 38 
separately required permits, including preliminary plat. perfonnance 
improvement bond, sewer plan, tree removal permit, final plans review, 
road drainage permit, and coastal area facilities perm1t. 6 
Government inspectors are increasingly frequ~nt, albeit unwelc~med, 
visitors to business premises. Milk plants also experience an 
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extraordinary variety of inspections. More than 20,000 state, county, 
local, and municipal milk jurisdictions exist in the U.S. A USDA study 
reveals. that milk plants are inspected about 24 times annually, even . 
.. 
though the Public Health Service recolllllends only two a year. · In ·one 
state, each milk plant averaged ninety-five inspections during a year. 
One milk plant, licensed by 250 local governments, three states and twenty 
other agencies reported that i.t was inspected 47 times in one month in 
1964. 
In the more traditional areas, many regulations deal with natural 
monopolies, such as in the case of utilities. In some of these one-industry 
regulatory efforts, however, the government actions may be anti-competitive 
and thus uJtimately costly to the consumer. Interstate trucking furnishes 
a cogent example, where federal regulation is in large degree a barrier . 
~o entry protecting existing firms against possible new entrants. 
A recent report prepared at the Center for the Study of American · 
Business at Washingto~ University estimates that the aggregate cost of 
complying with federal regulation came to $62.8 billion in 1976 or twe~ty· 
times the direct cost to the taxpayer of supporting the major· ·regulatory 
agencies7 (see Table 4). 
The basic approach followed in the study was to cull from the avail-
able literature the more reliable. estimates of the costs of specific 
regulatory programs, to put those estimates on a consistent and reliable 
basis, and to aggregate the results for 1976. Where a range of costs 
was available for a given regulatory program, the lower end of the range 
was generally used. In many other cases no cost estimates were available. 
Thus, the.numbers in the studY are low and underestimate the actual costs 
of federal regulation in the United States. 
/ 
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Table 4 
Annual Cost of Federal Regulation, 
By Area, 1976 
(millions of dollars) 
Administrative Compliance 
Area Cost Cost 
Consumer Safety and Health 1 ,516 5,094 
Job Safety and Working Conditions 483 4,015 
Energy and the Environment 612 7,760 
Financial Regulation 104 1,118 
Industry Specific 474 26,322 
Paperwork (a) 18,000 
Total 3,189 62,309 
(a) Included in other categories 
Source: Center for the Study of American Business 
Total 
6,610 
4,498 
8,372 
1;222 
26,796 
18,000 
65,498 
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Table 4 
Annual Cost of Federal Regulation, 
Area 
Consumer Safety and Health 
By Area, Calendar 1976 
(millions of dollars) 
Admi ni strati ve 
Cost 
1,516 
Job Safety and Working Conditions 483 
Energy and the Environment 612 
Financial Regulation 104 
Industry Specific 484 
Paperwork (a) 
Total 3,199 
(a) Included in other categories 
Compliance 
Cost 
5,094 
4,015 
7,760 
1 '118 
19,919 
25,000 
62,906 
Total 
6,610 
4,498 
8,372 
1,222 
20,403 
25,000 
66,105 
Source: Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University. 
Revised 12/78 
./"l 
(.f 
' : 
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The estimates of r·egulatorjf costs include cost5 incurred by the 
federal government and costs incurred by economic units in response to 
regulation. In the first category, administrative costs are the expendi-
tures arising from the operation of a regulatory activity by the federal 
government. These include salaries of government workers, office supplies, 
etc. They are the outlays for regulator·y purposes which are reported in 
the federal budget. The second category, compliance costs, are those 
costs incurred mainly by the private sector (and also by state and local 
governments) in the process of complying with the federal regulatory 
mandates. These expenditures do not show up in the federal budget and 
were estimated. 
Regulation and Innovation 
As William D. Carey of the American Association for the Advancement 
of Sci~nce has stated, "Government may imagine that it is neutral toward 
the rate and quality of technological risk-taking, but it is not .•• 
regulatory policies aimed at the public interest rarely consider impacts 
on innovat1on ... 8 The adverse effect of regulation on innovation is likely 
to be felt more strongly by smaller firms and thus have an anti-competitive 
impact. According to Dr. Mitchell Zavon, president of the American 
Association of Poison Control Centers, 
"We've got to the point in regulatory action where 
it's become so costly and risky to bring out pro-
ducts that only the very largest firms can afford 
to engage in these risky ventures. To bring out a 
new pesticide you have to figure a cost of $7,000,000 
and seven years of time ... g 
One hidden cost of government regulation is a reduced rate of intro-
duction of new products. The longer it takes for a new product to be 
approved by a government agency -- or the more costly the approval process 
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-- the less likely that the new ptoduct will be created . In any event, 
innovation will be delayed. 
Professor Sam Peltzman of the University of Chicago has estimated, 
for example, that the 1962 amendments to the Food and Drug Act are delaying 
the introduction of effective .drugs by about four years, as well as leading 
to higher prices for pharmaceutical products. 10 As a result in large 
part of the mar~ stringent drug regulations, the United States was the 
thirtieth country to approve the anti-asthma drug metaproterenol, the 
th1 rty-second country to app~'ove the anti -cancer drug adri amyci n, the 
fifty-first to approve the anti-tuberculosis drug rifampin, the sixty-fourth 
to approve the anti-allergenic drug cromolyn, and the or1e hundred sixth 
to approve the anti-bacter·ial drug co-tr1maxazole .. 11 
According to Thomas G. Moore of the Hoover Institution at Stanford 
University, regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission delayed the 
introduction of unit trains by at least five years and delayed full use 
by the Southern Railroad of the "Big John" cars used to carrygra1n;; 12 
Ann Friedlander has estimated the loss in the railroad industry due to 
retarded innovation at between $12 million and $41 million a year. 13 
Regulation and Capital Formation 
Federal regulation also affects the prospects for economic growth 
and productivity by levying a claim on a rising share of new capital 
formation. This effect of regulation is mast evident in the environment~l 
and safety areas. According to the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, 
private capital outlays for pollution control in 1975 were $3.8 b1111on 
higher than would have been the case in the absence of federal environmental 
requirements. 14 Similarly, the McGraw-Hill Department of Economics esti-
mates the cost to American industry of meeting the occupational health 
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and safety r·egulations at about $3 billion a year. Thus these t"'o programs 
alone account for 6 percent of total capital spending in the private 
sector of the American economY, which came to $113 billion in 1975. 
Edward Denison of the Brookings Institution has estimated the loss 
of pt·oduct 1 vi ty experienced 1 n the United States 1 n recent years 1 n 
meeting government pollution and job safety standards. The loss in 
productivity results both from diversion of capital investment as well 
as· from current expenses in meeting these regulatory requirements. 
By 1975, output per unit of input in the nonresidential business sector 
of the economY was 1.4 percent smaller than it would have been if business 
had operated under the regulatory conditions of 1967. Of this amount, 
Denison ascribes 1.0 percent to pollution abatement and 0.4 percent to 
emplpyee safety and health programs. 15 
The reductions had been small in 1968 - 1970, but were rising rapidly 
1n the 1970's. The increase in the amount of such lost productivity cut 
the annual change in output per unit of input by 0.2 percent in 1973, 
0.4 percent in 1974, and 0.5 percent in 1975. The recent reduction in 
' I 
growth rates is equivalent to a large portion of the recent rises 1n 
economic growth. 16 
Capital formation and productivity may also be advers.ely affected 
by the uncertainty about ~he future of regulations governing .the 1-ntro.duction 
of new processes and products. An example is furnished in the report 
of a task force of the U.S. Energy Resources Council dealing with the 
possibility of developing a new synthetic fuel industry. In evaluatin~ 
the impact of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 
the task force reported, "It would be next to impossible at this time ~o 
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predict the impact of these requil~ements on synthetic fuels productfon ... 17 
ln cons1dering the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 1 .the task 
force stated that the major uncertainty was not whether a project· wo~~~ 
be allowed to ·proceed, but rather the length of time tha·t. it. would be 
delayed pending the issuance of an environmental impact.statement that 
would stand up in court. In assessing the overall impact of government 
regulatory activity on the establishment of a new energy industry, the 
task force concluded, 11 ln summary, some of these requirements could easily 
hold up or permanently postpone any attempt to build and operate a syn-
thetic fuels plant ... 18 
Regulation and Employment 
Government regulation, albeit unintentionally, can have strongly 
adverse effects on employment. The minimum wage law, for example, has 
priced many teenagers out of labor markets. One recent study has shown 
that the 1966 increase in the statutory minimum wage reduced teenage 
employment in the United. States by 225,000 below what it. otherwise would 
have been in 1972. Thus, as a result of that one change in government 
regulation, the youth unemployment rate in 1972 was 3.8 percentage points 
higher than it would otherwise have been" 19 
In construction labor -- where unemployment rates are substantially 
above the national average -- government regulation also acts to price 
some segments of the work force out of competitive labor markets. Under 
the Davis-Bacon legislation, the Secretary of Labor promulgates 11preva111ng 11 
wages to be paid on federal and federally-supported construction·projects. 
A variety of studies has shown that these federally mandated wage rates 
are often above those that actually prevail in the labor market where 
the work is to be done. 20 
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Regulation and Small Business 
Government regulation!) often unwittingly, tends. to hit small business _. 
d1sp~oportionately hard. 21 Most of this impact is un~ntent1~na1, in that 
the regulations typically do not distinguish ·among companies of different 
sizes. But in practice, forcing a very small finn. to fill out the s·ame 
specialized forms as a large company with highly ... trai_ned technica.f staffs 
at its disposal places a significantly greater burden on that small~r. 
enterprise. This general point is supported by data and examples for 
such different governmental regulatory activities as the Environmenta.l 
Protection Agency, the Employee Retirement Income Security Actp .National 
Labor Relations Board, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
A current example of governrrent regulation affecting small business 
disproportionately is the proposed standards for air-lead exposure levels 
promulgated by the Occupational Safety and.Health Administration. The 
impact of these standards has been examined in a recent study by Charles 
River Associates. In the battery industry, which is made up of 143 f1 rms j) 
OSHA lead regulations are estimated to result in much larger per unit 
production costs for smaller plants than for larger plants. Because of 
large differential costs and the fact that battery prices would only rise . 
to cover the unit costs of the larger firms, smaller plant operators 
would be forced to absorb the differential in costs. In many cases the 
amount absorbed would eliminate entirely the plant's profitability. 
According to the Charles River Associates study, about 113 single plant 
battery firms would be forced to close, eliminating half of the productive 
capacity not operated by the five major battery companies. 
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It is much more difficult t:o assess the impact of regulations .. that 
are merely burdensome to small business, such as filling out government 
fonms and responding to information requests by regulatory agencies. 
The Commission on Federal Paperwork reports that S,OOOPOOO small businesses 
spend $15 - 20 billion, or an average of over $3,000 each on federal 
paperwork. Not all examples of the heavier burden of regulation on small 
business have to do with the newer regulatory agencies. A National Labor 
Relations Board election is a good example. Table 5 shows the total 
estimated cost per employee of an NLRB election by size of the company 
work force. Clearly the unit cost of meeting thfs·regulatory requirement 
is smaller for the large firm ($101.60 for companies with over 1,000 
employees) and larger for the small firm ($134.60 for firms with fewer 
than 100 workers). 2~ 
Table 5 
NLRB Election Costs ·~er Em~lolee 
Number of Employees Eligible to Vote 
Cost Categorl 50- 99 100-149 150-299 300-599 600-11000 1,000+ 
Legal $ 26.00 $ 19.00 $ 15.50 $ 12.00 $ 8.00 $ 8.00 
Employee Time 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27o00 
Loss fn 
Productivity 57.60 57.60 57.60 57.60 57 .. 60 57.60 
Executive Time 24.00 20.00 18.00 12.00 9.60 9.00 ~ 
Total Cost 
per Employee $134.60 $123.60 $118.10 $108.60 $102.20 $101.60 
Source: Michigan State University Business Topics 
•.:: 
I' 
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Regulation and Entre~reneuri.al Functions 
One of the unmeasurable effects of government regulation 1s what 
1t does to the basic entrepreneurial nature of the private enterprise 
system. To the extent that management's attention is diverted from 
traditional product development, production, and marketing concerns to 
meeting governmentally imposed social requirements, a significant bureau-
c.rat1zat1on of corporate activity results. 
In employee pension fund manag~ment, for example, the recently 
enacted pension regulation has shifted much of the concern of fund mana-
gers from.maximizing the return on the contributions to a more cautious 
approach of minimizing the likelihood that the managers will be criticized 
for their investment decisions. It thus becomes safer -- although not 
necessarily more desirable for the employees covered -- for the pension 
managers to keep mote detailed records of their deliberat ions, to h1re 
more outside experts {so that the responsibility can be diluted), and to 
avoid innovative 1nvestments. 23 
In the occupational safety and health area, professional safety staffs 
are often diverted from their bdsic function of training workers 1n.safer 
operating procedures to filling out fonns, posting notices,· and meeting 
other essentially bureaucratic requirements. OSHA directives, for example, 
contain very specific requirements for virtually every piece of equipment 
used in the production of steel. These requirements range from such major 
items as coke ovens all the way down to such minutiae as the ladders used 
in plants and the mandatory 42-inch height from the floor for portable 
fire extinguishers. 
The results measured by any improvement in safety are almost invariably 
disappointing. Two major studies of the occupational safety and health 
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(OSHA) progr·am to date have yielded negative findings. Nicholas A. Ashford 
concluded that "The OSHA Act has failed thus far to live ~P to its poten-
tial for reducing job injury and disease •.• OSHA has had little measurable 
impact in reducing injuries and deaths." 24 
In a more detailed statistical ana·lysis, RobertS. Smith reported 
similar findings, ..... the estimated effects Lof OSHA7 on injuries are so 
small that they cannot be distinguished from zero ... 25 Apparently, the 
original concern of the public and the Congress to reduce accidents has 
been converted to obeying rules and regulations. The disappointing results 
lead to a predictable reaction; redouble the existing effort -- more rules. 
more fonns, more inspection, and thus higher costs to the taxpayer and 
higher prices to the consumer. 
More recent statistics on occupational injuries and illnesses are 
hardly reassuring. The reported overall accident and illness rate have 
been declining, from 10.4 per 100 workers in 1974 to 9.1 in 1975. However, 
the number of workdays lost to injuries and illnesses per 100 workers 
actually rose, to 54.4 in 1975 from 53.1 in 1974. On the average the 
affected workers took more time off than in the previous year. This could 
indicate that the injuries and illnesses that did occur in 1975 were 
typically more severe. Apparently the impact of OSHA occurred primarily 
in reducing the number of minor accidents and illnesses. 
Approaches to Regulatory Reform 
A new way of looking at the microeconomic effects of regulatory 
programs may be helpful to public policymaking. A parallel can be drawn 
to macroeconomic matters, where important and at times conflicting objec-
tives are recognized and attempts at reconciliation or trade-off are made 
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(for example, as among economic growth, employment, income distribution, 
and pr1ce.stabil1ty). At the microeconomic level, it may likewise be 
appropriate to reconcile the goals of specific government programs with 
national objectives. 
Healthy working conditions, for example, are an important national 
objective, but not the only important national objective. Society 
supposedly should avoid selecting the most costly and disruptive methods 
of achieving a higher degree of job safety. Similarly, environmental 
protection, product safety, and other regulatory efforts should be 
related to costs to the consumer, availability of new products, and the 
employment of the work force. In part, this reconciliation can be made 
at the initial stages of the governmental process. when the President 
proposes and the Congress enacts a new regulatory program. 
Benefit/Cost Analysis 
One device for broadening the horizons of government policymakers 
and administrators is the economic impact statement. Policymakers could 
be required to consider the costs (and other adverse effects) of their 
actions as well as the benefits. 
This is not a novel idea. In November 1974, then President Gerald 
Ford instructed the federal agencies under h·is jurisdiction to examine 
the effects of the major regulatory actions on· costs, productivity, 
employment, and other economic factors. This first step was subject to 
several shortcomings. Many of the key regulatory agencies -- ranging 
from the Consumer Product Safety Commission to the Federal Trade Commission 
-- are so-called "independent agencies," which· are beyond the· President's 
jurisdiction. 
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Second, even in the case of the regulatory activities that come 
within presidential jurisdiction, the existing policy is limited to the 
regulations that, in the issuing agency•s own estimation, are "major. 11 
Third, the agencies covered by the Executive Order are only required to 
examine the economic aspects ·of their actions; the weight they give to 
economic factors remains in their discretion -- to the extent that 
Congressional statutes permit them to give any consideration to economic 
influences at all. 
Within these constraints, the Council on Wage and Price Stability 
has intervened in many cases of proposed regulation to offer its analyses 
of the benefits and the costs of the proposed action. The agencies have 
rarely welcomed this advice, but the publicity given some of. the Council's 
analyses may have at times provided a deterrent to the more traditionally-
minded personnel of regulatory agencies, as well as serving a larger 
public educational purpose. 
A broader approach may be warranted, one with a strong legislative 
mandate. In the fashion of the environmental impact statements (but 
hopefully without as much of the trivia), Congress could require each 
regulatory agency to assess the impact of its proposed actions on the 
society as a whole, and particularly on the economY. Much_ would depend 
on the 11 teeth" put into any required economic imp.act statemen~. Merely 
legislating the performance of some economic analysis by an unsym~athet1c 
regulator would serve little purpose beyond delaying the regulatory proces~ 
·and making it more costly. But limiting. government regulation to those 
instances where the total benefits to society exceed the costs would be . 
a major departure from current practice. 
- 37 -
To an eclectic economist, government regulation should be carried 
to the point where the incremental costs equal the incremental benefits, 
and no further. Indeed, this is the basic criterion that is generally 
used to screen government investments in physical resources. Overregula-
tion -- which can be defined as regulation for which the costs exceed 
the benefits -- would be avoided under this approach. 
Many of the proposa·ls to reform government regulation involve the 
"sunset" mechanism -- the compulsory periodic review of each major 
regulatory program to determine whether it is worthwhile to cQntinue 1t 
- . 
1n the light of changing circumstances. A benefit/cost analysis would 
provide a quantitative mechanism to aid in making those value judgments. 
Budgeting as a Management Tool 
Attention should be given to the role of the budget process in manag-
ing regulation. In those cases where an agency's regulations generate 
more costs than benefits, the agency's budget for the 90ming year might 
be reduced. Budget reviewers, be they examiners in the· executive branch 
or committee staffs in the legislature, face the perennial question of 
how to measure the effectiveness of an agency that does. not pro vi de market.-
. able outputs. The traditional response is to concentrate on the inputs 
ut111zed (as, for example, workload statistics}. Benefit/cost analysis, 
cost/effectiven~ss analysis (which is in effect the search fo~ least-cost 
solutions) or other quantitative forms of program evaluation may provide 
useful alternatives in such cases. 
Because the requested appropriations for the regulatory .agencies are 
relatively small portions of the government's budget, limited ~ttent1~n .· 
has been given to these activities in the bu.dget process. In view of the 
large costs that they often impose on the society as a whole (those "hidden · 
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taxes 11 shifted to the private sector), gr~,;ater attention than now given 
is warranted to the •·eviews of thft appropriation requests for regulatory 
programs. 
The wide dissemination of data on the economic impacts of ·government 
regula.tion also may serve to alter the balanr.e of forces now exerted by~ 
interest groups on the decision making process. At present, interest 
grou1>s are most often we 11 awa r·e of the benefits they would rece1 ve from 
a proposed regulation, and thus the.; mobi 1 i ze the1 r forces to promote 
that regulation. But 1nfonnation on the adverse consequences of the 
regulation, if widely distributedt might gene,~ate countervailing pressures 
from other groups. 26 
Changing Attitudes Toward Re[ulatipfl 
Basically, however, it is attitudes that may need to be changed. 
Experience with the job safety program provides a cogent example. Although 
the government's safety rules have resulted in billions of dollars 1n 
public and private outlays, the basic goal of a safer work environment 
h~s not been achieved. 
A more satisfying answer to improving the effectiveness of government 
regulation of private activities requires a basic change 1~ the approach 
to regulation, and one not limited to the job safety program. Indeed, 
that program is used here merely as an illustration~ If the objective of 
public policy is to reduce accidents, then public policy should focus 
directly on the reduction of accidentso Excessively detailed regulatfons 
are often merely a substitute -- the normal bureaucratic substitute --
for hard policy decisions. 
Rather than emphasis being placed on issuing citations to emp.loyers 
who fa11 to fill fonns out correctly or who do not post tne required notices, 
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it should be placed on the regulation of those employe.rs with high and 
rising accident rates. Perhaps fines should be levied on those es~abltsh~ 
ments with the worst safety records. As the accident rates decline ·. 
toward some sensible average standard, the fines could be reduced or :·. 
eliminated. 
But the government should not be much concerned with the way· a · 
specific organization achieves a safer working environment. Some ~ompan1es 
may find it more efficient to change work rules, others to buy new equ1_p-
ment, and still others to retrain workers. The making of this choice 1s 
precisely the kind of operational business decision making that govern-
ment should avoid, but that now dominates many regulatory programs.-
Without diminishing the responsibility of the employers, the sanctions 
under the federal occupational safety and health law should be extended 
to employees, especially those whose negligence endangers other employees. 
The purpose here is not to be harsh, but to set up effective incentives 
to achieve society•s objectives. This can be a preferred alternative to 
government specifying the details of what it considers to be 11acceptable11 
private ~ction. 
A recent case in point is provided by the proposed job safety · 
standards for exposure to lead in the workplace. OSHA would re~uire 
smelters, battery manufacturers and other firms to install engineering 
controls that reduce the maximum exposure level from its present 200 
micrograms of lead per cubic meter of air to 100 micrograms. 
The_U.S. Council on Wage and Price Stability has estimated·that· 
meeting the proposed standards could cost the industries affected and 
ultimately consumers over $300 million a year. The Council urges that 
OSHA allow each company to use the most efficient way of achieving the 
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new standard, whether that requi _ .. es costly engineering controls or some 
other method. 27 Intensive employee training might be one of those 
alternate methods, if a study in the United Kingdom can serve as a guide. 
According to a report in the British Journal of Industrial Medicine, the 
lead exposures of employees doing almost identical jobs differed by ratios 
of up to four to one. This was tota 'lly attributed to persona 1 differences 
1n working hab1ts. 28 
With reference to consumer protection regulation, an infonnation 
strategy may often provide a sensible alternative. For the many visible 
hazards that consumers voluntarily subject themselves to, perhaps the 
most important consideration of public policy is to .improve the individual's 
knowledge of the risks involved r·ather than limit personal discretion. 
In their daily lives, citizens rarely opt for zero risk alternatives. 
For example, many pedestrians voluntarily race across a busy intersect ion 
rather than wait for the traffic light to change. 
Alternatives to Regulation 
The promulgation bY government of rules and regulations restricting 
or prescribing private activity of course is not the only means of accom-
plishing public objectives. Codes of behavior adhered to on a voluntary 
basis may often be effective. 29 Trade associations on occasion have 
served such a socially useful function in upgrading the level of.bus1ness 
performance. 
Government itself has available to it various powers other tha~ the 
regulatory mechanism. Through its taxing authority, the government can 
provide strong signals to the market. Rather than promulgating detailed 
regulations governing allowable discharges into the nation's waterways, 
the government could levy substantial taxes on those discharges. Such 
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sumptuary taxation could be "progressive," to the extent that the tax 
rates would rise faster than the amount of pollution emitted by an 
individual polluter. Thus, there would be an incentive for finms to 
concentrate on remov;ng or at least reducing the more serious instances 
of pollution. 
The use of taxation would neither be meant to punish polluters nor 
to give them a "license'' to pollute. Rather it would be using the price 
system to encourage producers and consumers to shift to less polluting . 
ways of producing and consuming goods and services. The cost of removal 
of pollution for each organization, compared to the size of the tax, 
would determine the level of environmental cleanup that it pursues. Those 
that can control pollution more cheaply wi11 clean up more (and thus pay 
less tax). Those with higher control costs will clean up less (and pay 
more pollution taxes). This approach attempts to achieve a given level 
of environmental quality with minimum resource use by equalizing the 
marginal cost of pollution contro1. 30 
In the case of the traditional one-industry type of government regula-
tion (as of airlines, trucking, and railroads) a greater role should be 
given to the competitive process and to market forces. Unlike the newer 
forms of regulation on which this paper concentrates, the older forms of 
regulation are often mainly barriers to entry into a given industry, pro-
tecting existing fi·rms from competition by potential new entrants. It 1s 
in this limited sense that deregulation is a viable option. The elimina-
tion of regulation in the safety, ecology, and related areas does not 
appear to be a realistic alternative in view of the nation•s long-tenm 
social concerns. 
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Indeed, any realistic appraisal of government regulation must 
~cknow1edge that important and positive benefits have resulted from 
many of these activities -- less pollution, fewer product hazards, · 
reducing job discrimination, and other socially desirable goals of our ·· 
society. But the "externalities" generated by federal regulation cannot · 
justify government attempting to regulate every facet of private behavior. 
As Henry Owen and Charles Schultze have pointed out, a reasonable approach 
to this problem requires great discrimination 1n sorting out the hazards 
that 1t 1s important to regulate from the kinds of lesser hazards that 
can best be dealt with by "the normal prudence of consumers, workers, 
and bus 1 ness fi nns ... Jl 
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Appendix: Federal Expenditures for Regulation of Business 
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Appendix Table 1 
and Health 
Agency 1974 19'75 1976 1977 1978 1979 
De~artment of Agriculture 
Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service 314 345 377 337 220 219 
Federal Grain Inspection 
Service 9 . 23 23 
Food Safety and Quality 
Service 138 619 588 
Subtotal 314 345 377 484 862 830 
De~artment of Health, Educa-
tton 1 and Qe11are 
Food and Drug Admin1stra-
tion 165 201 218 245 283 298 
De~artment of Housing and 
Or an Deve1oEment 
Interstate Land Sales and 
Other Regulatory Functions 1 2 * 2 1 * 
De~artment of Justice 
Antitrust Division 14 18 21 26 35 45 
Drug Enforcement Admin-
190 194 1stration** 98 132 146 167 
Subtotal 112 150 167 193 225 . 239 
Deeartment of Trans~ortation 
National Highway Traffic 
151 169 206 246 Safety Administration 157 150 
Federal Railroad Admin1-
strati on a 7 9 15 17 21 2-i 
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Appendix Table 1 ( cCJn t ·l ~·ued) 
A gene.)! 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
- - - - - -
Coast Guard 210 162 192 261 281 294 
Federal Aviation Adm1n1-
strati on 2 1 * 1 1 ... 
Federal Hfghw~ Adm1n1-
strati on 6 7 7 8 13 
Subtotal 376 328 365 455 517 578 
De~artment of the Treasur~ 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
and F1 reanns 79 95 103 117 127 134 
Customs Service 228 299 334 436 510 534· 
Subtotal . 307 394 437 553 637 668 
Consumer Product Safetx 
Co11111isston 19 34 38 40 42 40 
National Trans~ortat1on 
Safety Board 8 9 11 13 15 15 
Consumer Protection Act1v1t1es 3b 
Total 1,302 1,463 1,613 1,985 2,582 2,671 
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Appendix Table 2 
Exf!elld1tures on Federal Regulatur~ Activftfes. 
Jo6 Sarett ana Ot~er AorE~ng onafttons (Fiscal Years, Millions of Dollars) 
Agency 1974 1975 1976 1977 1m ill! 
De~artment of the Inte\~ior 
Office of Surface Mining,. 
Reclamation and Enforcementc 16 . 1 
M1 ni ng Enforcement a tad 
Safety Administration 59 68 84 
..1! ..!! d 
- -
Subtotal 59 68 84 98 69 1 
Department of Labor 
Employmegt Standards Admini-
strati on 56 72 84 60 67 ' 77 
Labor-Management Services 
Administration 24 27 37 47 55 58 
Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration 69 90 109 127 129 150 
Mine Safety and Health 
Administration d _q d _q ~ 124 
- -
Subtotal 149 189 230 234 306 409 
Egual Bm~lolment O~~ortuni~ 
~ornniss~on 42 56 59 72 88 108 
National Labor Re·t at ions 
UOard 55 61 67 81 92 100 
Occu~ational Safet~ and 
Realtn ~eview ~omm1sslon 5 s· _.§. _J_ _J_ _! 
- -
Total 310 379 446 . 492 ·562 626 
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Appendix Table 3 
Agency 1974 1975 1976 lll: 1978 1979 . 
- - -
Department of Ener~f 33 121 136 199 238 284 
Council on Environmental Quality 2 3 3 4 3 3 
Environmental Protection 
Agency 232 317 363 436 473 522 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 80 86 180 231 ill.. 307 . 
- -
Total 347 527 682 870 989 1 '116 
Appendix Table 4 
Expenditures on Federal Regulatorf
1
Actfv1tfes, Financial 
and Otner nanc~a1 . 
Reporting, 
(Fiscal Years. Millions of Dollars) 
Agency 1974 1975 .1976 illl ill! 1m. 
Cost Accounting Standards 
Board 1 1 1 2 2 2 
Council on Wage and Price 
Stab111ty * 1 2 2 2 
Securities and Exchange 
65 Com1ss1on 35 44 
..ll .!i 66 
- - - -
Total 36 45 53 58 70 69 
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Appendix Table 5 
Agency 1974 1975 1976 llli. 1978 1979 
- - - -· 
C1vf1 Aeronautics Board 89 81 91 103 10l 96 . 
Commod1tl Futures Trading 
Conwn1ssfon 39 39 11 14 15 16 
Federal Communications 
Conm1ss1on 38 48 53 56 70 66 
Federal Maritime Commission 6 7 8 8 10 10 
Federal Power Conmiss1on 27 34 h h h h 
Federal Trade Commission 32 39 44 52 62 64 
International Trade Contn1ss1on 7 8 10 11 12 13 
Interstate Commerce Commission 38 44 47 59 64 69 
Renegotiation Board 5 5 6 _! _! _]_ 
- - -
Total 245 269 270 309 340 341 
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Notes: 
* Less than $1 mf111on 
** Actfv1t1es extend beyond business regulation (breakdown not available). 
(a) Railroad Safety only. 
(b) Costs of proposed Consumer Representation less saving from consolidating 
Consumer Protection Activities. 
(c) Regulation and Technology only. 
(d) During FY 1978, MESA functions were transferred to th~ Mine Safety 
and Health Administration under the Department of Labor. 
' ' ' 
(e) Costs for improving and protecting wages and e11m1natfo~ of discrimination 
fn employment only. 
(f) Energy information, policy, and regulation. 
(g) Expenditures for Commodity Exchange Authority. 
(h) Federal Power Commission functions have been transferred to the 
Department of Energy. 
Source: Computed from details 1n the Budget of the United States Government, 
Fiscal Year 1979. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1978. 
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